Dan(iel) Giberman



"Ostrich Tropes" Synthese (2022) 200: 1-25.

According to the cluster of theories in the metaphysics of properties known as 'trope' theories, properties are collections of particular qualitative instances. Though increasingly influential, the cluster is sufficiently diverse for there to be little agreement as to the prospects of its members. The present essay articulates and defends a conception of tropes as primitively qualitatively complex, somewhat in the vein of Quinean nominalist objects. After clarifying the relationships among tropes, properties, property exemplification, and property conferral, the essay discusses the benefits of this new 'ostrich' trope theory. Specifically, the theory explains better than prior trope theories both the spatiotemporal status of tropes and the capacity tropes have to confer properties onto objects. Moreover, the theory is immune to many of the concerns that threaten more orthodox trope ontologies.

"Whole Multiple Location and UniversalsAnalytic Philosophy (forthcoming)

According to the broadly Aristotelian distinction between universals and particulars, all and only the former are capable of whole multiple location. The present essay defends this distinction against four putative counterexamples. The first two, extended simple material objects and enduring time traveling self-meeters, putatively are wholly multiply locatable, but not universals. The second two, unique properties of point-sized entities and Platonic (i.e. not spatiotemporally located) universals, putatively are universals, but not wholly multiply locatable. The defensive strategy is to resist certain presuppositions underlying the examples.

"Panprotopsychism InstantiatedJournal of the American Philosophical Association (2022) 8.2: 238-258

The problem of many-over-one asks how it can be that *many* properties are ever instantiated by *one* object. A putative solution might, for example, claim that the properties are appropriately bundled, or somehow tied to a bare particular. The present essay argues that, surprisingly, an extant candidate solution to this problem is at the same time an independently developed candidate solution to the mind-body problem. Specifically, what is argued here to be the best version of the 'relata-specific bundle theory', the thesis that each instance of compresence has a special intrinsic nature in virtue of which it necessarily bundles its specific bundle-ees is also a species of Russellian monism, labeled recently by David Chalmers as 'constitutive Russellian panprotopsychism'. The upshot of this connection is significant for the metaphysics of the mind-body problem. Specifically, a credible theory of property instantiation turns out to have a built-in account of how consciousness is grounded in certain (broadly) physical systems.

"Deep Gunk and Deep Junk" Synthese (2021) 199.3: 5645-5667.

All parts of mereologically 'gunky' entities have proper parts. All parts relevant to mereologically 'junky' entities *are* proper parts. This essay explores the application of gunk and junk beyond the standard category of material object. One such application yields what is here dubbed 'deep' gunk and junk: a material entity x all of whose intrinsic elements from any fundamental ontological category C either (a) have proper parts from C that also are intrinsic elements of x (deep gunk), or (b) are proper parts of entities from C that also are intrinsic elements of x (deep junk). In addition to being independently interesting, these mereological structures pose a challenge to the bare particular ontology of substance. For bare particulars standardly are assumed to be mereologically simple, yet a deep gunky or junky entity requires any associated bare particulars to be complex. The essay closes by examining the bare particular theorist's prospects for answering this challenge.

"Supertropestantivalism" The Philosophical Quarterly (2021) 71.4: 780-802.

According to the identity version of spacetime supersubstantivalism, material objects are numerically identical to spacetime regions. While the view has been commended for its parsimony and concordance with physics, it has not properly been assessed in light of the metaphysics of properties. The present essay fills this void by discerning several subspecies of identity supersubstantivalism, corresponding to various property ontologies. Finding them all wanting, the essay develops and defends a novel brand of supersubstantivalism based on the trope ontology. On this view, here dubbed 'supertropestantivalism', regions are pluralities of geometrically and topologically alike tropes, some of which bundle together as material objects. The resulting picture is not itself an identity version of supersubstantivalism, but it retains the originally attractive features of the identity version while avoiding the shortcomings of competing ontologies.

"What It Takes to be Hunky" Thought (2020) 9.1: 51-57.

A world is gunky iff every object that exists according to it has others as proper parts. A world is junky iff every object that exists according to it is a proper part of some others. Several philosophers have followed (Bohn 2009a) in then saying that a world is 'hunky' just in case it is both gunky and junky. The present note explains a need to clarify the determinative criteria for being hunky. It then provides the needed clarification and explains why the issue, though subtle, is not merely pedantic.

"PlurdurancePhilosophers' Imprint (2019) 19.54: 1-19.

Like most theories in first order metaphysics, theories of persistence generally aim at metaphysically necessary truth. Consequently, those that accept proper temporal parts of material entities are maximally competitive only when they accord with the full range of metaphysically possible temporal mereological structures. Consider, for example, a structure in which every element is a proper temporal part of some others (temporal junk). The present essay argues that temporal junk plausibly is possible and that perdurantism, the thesis that material entities persist by having distinct proper temporal parts at distinct times, does not accord with it. The essay then outlines a novel four-dimensionalist theory of persistence that accommodates junk. On this theory, material entities persist not in virtue of possessing proper temporal parts, but rather in virtue of being grounded by certain pluralities of fundamental property instances over their careers, and by sub-pluralities thereof over corresponding sub-intervals of their careers. Accordingly, this way of persisting is dubbed 'plurdurance'.

"On Stage With Gunk" Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2019) 97.2: 228-238.

A structure is temporally gunky just in case all of its temporal parts have proper temporal parts. Joshua Stuchlik [2003] objects to the stage theory of persistence from temporal gunk by arguing that the former requires instantaneous entities while the latter precludes them. It is argued here that stage theory can accommodate temporal gunk by invoking short-lived persisting stages. However, a new and more serious problem for stage theory is not far to seek. The short-lived stages that are needed to accommodate gunk accord with stage theory only if they are appropriately qualitatively static. The problem is that, unless stage theory abandons much of its dialectical force, some of the required stages fail this condition. Thus, Stuchlik is right that gunk shows a large class of worlds not to be stages, but wrong about which worlds these are.

"A Reason for the Non-Specialist to Care about the Metaphysics of Properties and Persistence" Inquiry. (2018) 61.2: 162-177.

We have compelling extra-philosophical reasons for caring about identity, parthood, and location. For example, we desire ceteris paribus that nothing every part of which is very near to our location be very near to the location of something dangerous, evil, or otherwise unpleasant. This essay argues that such considerations are relevant to certain first-order metaphysical debates, namely, the debates over immanent universals and tropes and endurantism and perdurantism, respectively. As a consequence, even the non-specialist has a reason to care about the metaphysics of properties and persistence.

"Bent, Not Broken: Why Exemplification Simpliciter Remains a Problem for Eternalist EndurantismErkenntnis. (2017) 82.5: 947-966.

One premise in David Lewis's well-known argument from temporary intrinsic properties in favor of temporal parts is the (putative) intuition that material objects exemplify such properties simpliciter, that is, without qualification. The argument has spawned a large critical literature, with commentators questioning the simplicity premise's motivation, content, dialectical force, and status as an intuition. The present essay has two chief goals: to provide a novel framework for clarifying Lewis's simpliciter premise and to explain how the resulting clarification upends a wide range of attempts in the literature to evade his conclusion. Central to both goals is the observation that exemplification simpliciter best comports with our most fundamental notion of property exemplification, a notion that applies equally well to material and atemporal abstract objects. 

 "Indiscernibility Does Not Distinguish Particularity" Thought. (2016) 5.4: 249-256. 

According to the indiscernibility characterization of the distinction between particulars and universals, only and all the former have possible numerically distinct indiscernible intrinsic qualitative duplicates. It is argued here that both the sufficiency and the necessity directions are defective and that indiscernibility thus does not distinguish particularity. Against sufficiency: universals may lack intrinsic qualitative character and thus be trivially indiscernible from one another.  Against necessity: pluralities of duplicate-less entities are at once duplicate-less and particular. 

 "Moving Parts: A New Indexical Treatment of Context-Shifting Predication" Synthese. (2016) 193.1: 95-124.

A context-shifting example involves a putatively non-ambiguous, non-elliptical, non-indexical declarative sentence, some distinct utterances of which differ in truth value despite sameness of place, time, surrounding objects, and other physical factors. Charles Travis has spawned a large literature by arguing that such examples undermine compositional truth-conditional semantics. After explaining how prior responses to Travis's examples fail in the metaphysical details, the present essay develops a new approach that treats a wide range of subject terms as disguised indexicals sensitive to mereological structure. 

 "A Topological Theory of Fundamental Concrete Particulars" Philosophical Studies. (2015) 172.10: 2679-2704.

Fundamental concrete particulars are needed to explain facts about non-fundamental concrete particulars. However, the former can only play this explanatory role if they are properly discernible from the latter. Extant theories of how to discern fundamental concreta primarily concern mereological structure. Those according to which fundamental concreta can bear, but not be, proper parts are motivated by the possibilities that all concreta bear proper parts (mereological 'gunk') and that some properties of wholes are not fixed by the properties of their proper parts ('emergence'). In response, theorists who hold that the fundamental concrete particulars can be proper parts may appeal to the possibility that every concrete particular is a proper part: that there is no mereologically maximal whole world (mereological 'junk'), as well as to the intuition that fundamental concreta are qualitatively homogeneous "blocks" from which non-fundamental concreta are built. After motivating the plausibility of gunk and junk, the present essay proposes a constraint on fundamental concrete particulars based on topology instead of mereology: the fundamental concrete particulars must be appropriately connected. This constraint has the unique advantage of consistency with each of gunk, emergence, junk, and the building block intuition. 

 "Junky Non-Worlds" (2015) Erkenntnis. 80.2: 437-443. 

A mereological structure is junky if and only if each of its elements is a proper part of some other. The young literature on junk has focused on junky worlds and whether they are counterexamples to unrestricted composition. The present note defends the possibility of junky structures that are not worlds. This possibility complicates a recent attempt in the literature to render junk consistent with a weakened form of unrestricted composition. The upshot is that junky non-worlds threaten the weakened form of unrestricted composition as much as junky worlds threaten the traditional version.

 "Is Mereology a Guide to Conceivability?" (2015) Mind. 124:121-146. 

Zombies are unconscious objects with conscious physical micro-duplicates. If zombies are possible then physicalism (the thesis that the physical determines the mental) is false. It has been argued that zombies are possible if conceivable for an agent with ideal rationality. At any rate, they are possible only if so conceivable. This essay uses a mereological constraint to highlight the fine-grained differences between actually conscious physical objects and certain of their actually consciousness-incapable proper parts. These mereological considerations form the basis of an argument by dilemma that zombies are inconceivable. Either an arbitrary actually conscious object might have had simpler consciousness-capable parts (and more complex consciousness-incapable parts) than it in fact has, or not. The affirmative horn leads to a version of panpsychism that is inconsistent with the ideal conceivability of zombies. The negative horn rules out zombies as incoherent. The upshot is a new reason to deny the conceivability of zombies.

 "Passing Through: Why Intrinsic-to-a-Time Endurantism Should Not Persist" (2014) Analytic Philosophy. 55: 1. 89-101

According to the traditional way of understanding debates in the metaphysics of persistence, perdurantists hold that persisting material objects have temporal proper parts while endurantists hold that they do not. Several theorists recently have suggested in opposition to this traditional picture that endurantism be understood as the thesis that the identity of a persisting object x is intrinsic to each of the times at which x is present. It is argued here that unless this non-traditional version of endurantism entails a certain haecceitist element, it is subject to counterexample from the metaphysical possibility that two qualitatively identical material objects "pass through" one another during some portion of their respective careers. It is argued further that the suggested version of endurantism does not mix well with haecceitism and that consequently it is best resisted. 

 "Tropes In Space" (2014) Philosophical Studies. 167.2: 453-472.

Tropes are particular features of concrete objects. Properties--the extensions of predicates--are primitive resemblance classes of tropes. Friends of tropes have been criticized for failing to answer three questions. First, are there fundamental items other than tropes? Second, what criteria determine whether some tropes are all and only the features of some one object? Third, can trope classes be formed adequately using only primitive resemblance? Trading on the spatiotemporal status of tropes, this essay offers new responses to each of these questions. The novel thesis is that there is a sui generis property called 'markedness', whose tropes "mark" certain locations in an ontologically basic way. The spatiotemporal distribution of markedness tropes fixes the distribution of familiar characterizing tropes like mass and charge, and characterizing tropes are bundled by being co-contained in the location of a maximally connected markedness trope. This novel theory of trope bundling is defended by appeal to theoretical utility: it is ontologically parsimonious and solves outstanding problems involving co-location and resemblance class construction. 

 "Against Zero-Dimensional Material Objects (And Other Bare Particulars)" (2012) Philosophical Studies. 160.2: 305-321 

A modus tollens against zero-dimensional material objects is presented from the premises (i) that if there are zero-dimensional material objects then there are bare particulars, and (ii) that there are no bare particulars. The argument for the first premise proceeds by elimination. First, bare particular theory and bundle theory are motivated as the most appealing theories of property exemplification. It is then argued that the bundle theorist's Ockhamism ought to lead her to reject spatiotemporally located zero-dimensional property instances. Finally, it is argued that since she must accept such instances if she accepts zero-dimensional material object bundles, she ought to avoid the latter. This leaves bare particular theory as the default view of zero-dimensional material objects. The argument for the second premise invokes the thesis that the exemplification of at least one sparse property is a prerequisite for the existence of any particular. It is argued from Humean considerations that bare particulars fail this prerequisite. 

 "T-Gunk and Exact Occupation" (2012) American Philosophical Quarterly. 49.2: 165-174.

An object is T-gunky just in case all its parts (i) have proper parts and (ii) are of non-zero measure in every spatial dimension. I show that a recent argument due to Hud Hudson--though not intended as a threat to gunk--bears on the possibility of T-gunky material objects in non-gunky space. I then show that the friend of T-gunk can circumvent Hudson's argument without abandoning pointy space or standard mereology. What is needed is a novel conception of the relation of exact occupation of pointy regions by T-gunky objects. With the new conception in hand, the friend of material T-gunk need not look to theories of gunky spacetime in order to reconcile the possibility of material gunk with mathematical physics. 

 "Who They Are and What De Se: Burge on Quasi-Memory" (2009) Philosophical Studies. 144: 297-311.

Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identity--facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one.